Introduction
In a parliamentary democracy, many important decisions including government formation are the outcome of bargaining between the parties in Parliament. The most influential model of legislative bargaining is the closed rule model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , which is based on Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore (1987) . 1 In this model, a party is randomly recognized to propose a complete distribution of ministerial payoffs and the remaining parties can accept or reject the proposal. This model has some properties that may be perceived as drawbacks: the proposer has a large advantage (he receives more than half of the total payoff under simple majority), and there is a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. In order to single out a unique prediction, the stationary equilibrium is selected. Stationary strategies are simple but by no means uncontroversial: a stationary strategy requires a party to always make the same proposal regardless of the history of the negotiations so far. Moreover, Norman (2002) shows that sharp predictions 2 There have been other demand bargaining models in the literature. Binmore (1985) presents a three-player "market model" where demands are carried over to the next round and infinite plays are possible. Selten (1992) presents a general but relatively complicated model, including random draws and costs of both formulating a demand and forming a coalition. Bennett and van Damme (1991) study a simpler version in which each player selects the next one to move, and show that there may be a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. Using a refinement, they select the proportional payoff division for apex games.
Winter (1994), Dasgupta and Chiu (1998) , and Vidal-Puga (2004) use various demand commitment procedures to implement the Shapley value in convex games.
mands for ministerial payoffs and a coalition emerges between parties making compatible demands. The Head of State chooses the first mover, and the latter chooses the order in which the parties formulate demands. Because the first mover chooses the order of moves, it may be able to play the remaining parties off against each other and obtain the whole payoff, even though the rules of the game allow the other parties to exclude the first mover (see Montero and Vidal-Puga (2006) ). In this paper we study a modified bargaining procedure in which the parties must move in decreasing order of voting weight, and show that equilibrium payoffs inside the coalition that forms are proportional to the weights. The first mover has no disproportionate advantage and no refinements of subgame perfect equilibrium are needed to obtain the result.
2 The model
Weighted majority games
Consider a legislature in which n parties are represented. We denote these as N = {1, 2, ..., n}. There is a budget of size 1 to be divided by majority rule.
Each party i has ω i votes, and a quota of q is needed for a majority. The pair [q; (w i ) i∈N ] is a weighted majority game. Notice that the game is not affected if weights and quota are multiplied by the same positive constant.
Given a vector x ∈ R N and a coalition S ⊂ N , we denote as x S the sum of the coordinates of the members of S, x S := P i∈S x i .
A coalition S ⊂ N is winning if ω S ≥ q; it is minimal winning if it is winning and no T Ã S is winning. We denote as Ω (ω) the set of all winning coalitions, and as Ω m (ω) the set of all minimal winning coalitions.
A dummy player is a player who does not belong to any minimal winning coalition.
A weighted majority game is constant-sum if S ∈ Ω (ω) ⇐⇒ N \S / ∈ Ω (ω) for all S. It admits an equivalent homogeneous representation if there exists a vector of votes ¡ ω h 1 , ..., ω h n ¢ and a quota q h such that Ω m (ω) = Ω m ¡ ω h ¢ = © S ⊂ N : ω h S = q h ª . A weighted majority game that admits an equivalent homogeneous representation is called a homogeneous game.
Homogeneous representations do not always exist and when they exist they may not be unique. For example, [5; 3, 2, 2, 1] and [7; 4, 3, 3, 1] are two homogeneous representations of the same game. Peleg (1968) shows that constant-sum homogeneous games have a unique homogeneous representation (up to multiplication by a positive constant and to the weight that is assigned to dummies, which may be 0 or a sufficiently small number).
The bargaining procedure
Let [q; (w i ) i∈N ] be a constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority game.
There is a budget of size 1 to divide. Party i's utility function is u i = x i , where x i is i's share of the budget. Bargaining proceeds as follows. Parties move in decreasing order of weight. We label the parties in this order, so that party 1 moves first, followed by party 2, etc.
Each party i makes a demand d i , following the order of play, where
is the share of the budget party i claims. If, after party i makes its demand, there exists a winning coalition S ⊂ {j : j ≤ i} such that d S ≤ 1, party i has the additional choice of forming coalition S, in which case payoffs are distributed according to the demands made. If there is more than one possible S, party i decides which one is formed. If party n forms no coalition, the game ends with each party getting zero. 3 Given i ∈ N , we denote as P i the set of predecessors of i. Namely:
As it will become clear from the analysis, dummy players must get 0 in equilibrium, so for simplicity we assume there are no dummy players. We will 3 Alternatively, we may assume a finite number of bargaining rounds T without affecting the results.
use the homogeneous representation with ω n = 1; i.e. the weakest party has exactly 1 vote. Under these circumstances, every party in a constant-sum homogeneous game has a positive integer number of votes. Furthermore:
Lemma 1 Let [q; (w i ) i∈N ] be a constant-sum homogeneous game. Then,
Proof. Because n is not a dummy player, there exists S ∈ Ω m (ω) such that n ∈ S. Homogeneity implies ω S = q. Because S ∈ Ω m (ω), S\{n} must be losing. Since the game is constant-sum, (N \S) ∪ {n} ∈ Ω (ω). Moreover, by deleting the weakest party (i.e. party n) we obtain a losing coalition N \S.
Thus, (N \S) ∪ {n} ∈ Ω m (ω). So, ω (N\S)∪{n} = q and ω N\S = q − 1. Hence
Corollary 1 Let [q; (w i ) i∈N ] be a constant-sum homogeneous game. Then,
Proof. Since (N, v) is constant-sum and homogeneous, S is maximal losing iff N \S ∈ Ω m (ω), which means ω N\S = q and thus, under Lemma 1,
Lemma 2 Let [q; (w i ) i∈N ] be a weighted majority game. Then, there is a
Proof. Suppose this was not the case. Consider the smallest index i such that S = {1, ..., i} is a winning coalition. There is a minimal winning coalition S 0 ⊂ S, and S 0 is obtained from S by deleting at least one party j < i.
However, this is impossible because by assumption {1, ..., i − 1} is a losing coalition, and, since w j ≥ w i for all j < i, this coalition has at least as many votes as S 0 .
Lemma 2 does not hold for arbitrary orders of the parties. For example, if we take the game [3; 2, 1, 1, 1] and order the parties in such a way that the party with 2 votes is in the third place, no set of parties {1, ..., i} is a minimal winning coalition. If the parties play the game in this order, the party that moves first cannot get a positive payoff for any demand, and this leads to a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria.
Theorem 1 Let [q; (w i ) i∈N ] be a constant-sum homogeneous game. Suppose parties play a demand commitment game in decreasing order of weight. Then in any subgame perfect equilibrium the minimal winning coalition of Lemma 2 forms with each party i demanding
Proof. See Appendix .
The equilibrium strategies are roughly as follows (for a formal description see Appendix). Given the demands of the parties that have moved so far, party i determines two things: the optimal coalition to be (eventually)
formed and the optimal demand to make.
In general, the optimal coalition S will control exactly q votes. This coalition will generally include some parties that have moved before i, as well as some parties moving after i. Since T = S ∩ P i is a group of parties that have already formulated a demand, 1 − d T is the benefit from buying the votes of the parties in T ; this benefit will be shared by the parties in S\T . Buying less votes leads to a higher benefit, but more votes from parties moving after i will be needed to complete a winning coalition. The coalition S is chosen such that the average benefit per vote,
The optimal demand for party i will normally be
, that is, party i will claim a share of the benefit proportional to its number of votes.
Only in some subgames outside the equilibrium path can party i demand more than a proportional share.
Below we present a worked out example. Suppose forming some coalition is optimal. Then party 5 will form coali-
Ties are broken in favor of forming the coalition that includes party 4, to guarantee that party 4 has a best response in the previous stage. Hence the maximum demand 4 can make and still get into a coalition with 5 is
At stage 4, party 4 faces a vector of demands (
. It can form coalition {2, 3, 4} or make a demand that will lead to {1, 4, 5}. It forms
Thus, party 4 is effectively comparing the average benefit associated to buying the votes of 2 and 3 (in which case 1 vote is enough to complete a winning coalition) or the votes of 1 (in which case 2 votes are needed to complete a winning coalition and 4 must share the benefit with 5).
From the inequality above, the maximum demand party 3 can make at the previous stage and still induce {2, 3, 4} is
At stage 3, party 3 faces a vector of demands (d 1 , d 2 ). It can form coalition {1, 3} or make a demand that will induce {2, 3, 4}. It makes a demand if
Again, party 3 may buy the votes of party 1 (in which case 2 votes are required to complete a winning coalition), or the votes of party 2 (in which case 3 votes are required to complete a winning coalition). It chooses the alternative with the highest average benefit.
The maximum demand party 2 can make in the previous stage and still induce coalition {2, 3, 4} is
At stage 2, party 2 compares 1 − d 1 and
. This inequality can be rewritten as If the game is not constant-sum and homogeneous, proportionality may break down. In some cases, this is due to the presence of a party that can be "held hostage" by others, as pointed by Morelli (1999) . 
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
The result trivially follows if there is a veto player. In constant-sum games, a veto player must be a dictator, thus ω 1 = q, and d 1 = 1 would be the equilibrium outcome. We will assume from now on that ω i < q for all i.
We denote as B (d, i) with i ∈ N and d ∈ R P i the subgame which begins when it is party i's turn, facing a vector d of demands. At subgame B (d, i), party i will determine the optimal winning coalition S 3 i to be formed, and will formulate a demand d i that will lead to S being formed. We will show how party i determines which coalition is optimal as well as how the optimal coalition can be induced by the choice of d i .
Suppose we are in B (d, i), and party i plans to make a demand in the belief that a coalition S ∈ Ω (ω) with i ∈ S will be formed. This coalition should include some parties from N \P i (party i and possibly parties that move after it) and may also include some predecessors from P i . Let α be the number of votes controlled by parties in S ∩ (N \P i ). Then, the parties in S ∩P i should control at least q −α votes. We denote as b (i, α) the maximum benefit that can be achieved by buying these q − α votes from parties in P i .
Party i can calculate b(i, α) for every feasible value of α. Notice that not all integers between 0 and q are feasible for every player. First, α cannot be so small that even the votes of all the parties in P i would not suffice. Let
In order for b(i, α) to exist we need α ≥ γ i 0 . Since party i must be in S, it seems reasonable to require α ≥ ω i as well.
The next lemma shows that this is unnecessary: there is no positive benefit from buying more than q − ω i votes.
Lemma 3 Let γ i 0 ≤ α < ω i and assume no party j < i has made a strictly dominated choice of
Hence, since the game is homogeneous, T ∪ {i} cannot be a minimal winning coalition. Moreover, party i is the party with less votes in T ∪ {i}, thus coalition T should be winning. This means that either d T ≥ 1 (implying
would have been strictly better-off by setting a higher demand and forming a coalition, regardless of the actions of the parties moving after j.
is nondecreasing in the second variable.
We will eliminate strictly dominated strategies, thus in all the subgames we study it will be the case that b(i, α) ≤ 0 for γ i 0 ≤ α < ω i . Otherwise the turn would never have reached party i.
Since there is no positive benefit from buying more than q − ω i votes, and (given that there is no benefit left to be divided) the particular value of α is irrelevant if b(i, α) = 0, any lower bound between 0 and ω i can be equivalently used by party i. We take α to be greater or equal to: 5
Moreover, party i is constrained by the number of votes owned by parties in N \P i . Thus, α must be smaller or equal to
It follows from lemma 4.9 in Ostmann (1987) that ω i ≤ δ i+1 for all i < n, 
Otherwise party i + 1 will compare the best coalition that includes i with the best coalition that does not include i. Given that i is included in the coalition, i+1 needs to buy the remaining votes (q−(α + ω i )) from P i , and the best way to do this leads to a benefit of b(i, α + ω i );
the maximum benefit from buying q − α votes without buying i's votes is precisely b (i, α). Party i will then be included if d i is sufficiently low.
Whether d i is sufficiently low depends on the demands of the parties in P i . Because parties may be complements, in some cases no positive demand by i would be low enough, as the following example illustrates. 
Lemma 4 Assume we are in
Then
Proof. We have to prove that γ i 0 ≤ α + ω i ≤ δ i . It is straightforward:
is well defined and
We have defined the best way to form a coalition that contains α votes from N \P i and at least q −α votes from P i . It remains to choose the optimal value of α, and the optimal demand d i .
We denote as Σ i the set of values between γ i and δ i that maximize b (i, α) /α. Thus:
The next lemma shows that the only interesting bargaining occurs when
Lemma 5 Assume we are in a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of B (d, i).
If b ¡ i, σ i ¢ < 0 for some/all σ i ∈ Σ i , then every party gets zero. From now on, we will assume that b ¡ i, σ i ¢ ≥ 0 for all σ i ∈ Σ i . We will show that in equilibrium party i always chooses some α ∈ Σ i .
The following lemma shows that all values of α between δ i+1 + 1 and Lemma 6 Assume we are in the subgame B (d, i). Then
and contains party i. We study two cases:
) is also winning. Then, ω T ≥ q − ω N\P i+1 and the result is proved.
• T ∪ (N\P i+1 ) is losing. Then, since the game is constant-sum, we conclude that its complement, (N \T ) ∩ P i+1 , is winning and contains party i as the weakest member. By taking out party i, we obtain the coalition (N \T ) ∩ P i which is losing (since its complementary T ∪ (N \P i ) is winning). Thus, (N \T ) ∩ P i+1 is minimal winning and T ∪ (N \P i+1 ) is maximal losing. Hence, under Corollary 1:
Proof. Under Lemma 6, it is clear that b
.., ω i , since they minimize d T on the same coalitions T . Hence, if
for all α = 2, ..., ω i and thus the maximum is b
we conclude the result.
Now we define the maximum demand party i can make at B(d, i). This depends on what party i + 1 can achieve without party i. If party i + 1 decides to exclude party i, it is in a similar situation to party i except that it has less feasible values for α. It will be choosing an α between γ i and δ i+1 , and the maximum benefit from buying q − α votes without party i is precisely b(i, α). We define T i as the set of values between γ i and δ i+1 that maximize b (i, α) /α (recall that γ i ≤ δ i+1 , so the interval is nonempty).
For any values of σ i ∈ Σ i and τ i ∈ T i , we define
It is easy to prove that d * i is independent of the particular choice of σ i and τ i . By definition,
are independent of the τ i and σ i chosen. 
will still be independent of the choice of σ i because in this case
In order to prove that d * i is the equilibrium demand of party i, the following lemmas will be useful. Notice that σ i > ω i for some σ i ∈ Σ i implies i < n, because ω n = 1 and γ n = δ n = 1.
Lemma 7 Assume we are in B (d, i). If σ i > ω i for some σ i ∈ Σ i and party
and, given any τ i ∈ T i ,
Proof. Let σ i ∈ Σ i such that σ i > ω i . We first prove (2):
We have just proven that σ i − ω i is a feasible value of α for party i + 1.
We prove now (3) and (4). Under Lemma 4a), (3) is true when σ i − ω i < γ i 0 . Then (4) follows immediately by replacing
We have two cases:
. Since σ i ∈ Σ i , re-arranging terms,
Hence, (3) follows under lemma 4b). Moreover
Re-arranging terms,
Hence, (3) follows under lemma 4b).
To show (4), we distinguish two subcases:
, so two of the three cases are void.
Lemma 8 Assume we are in B (d, i + 1) and σ i > ω i for some
Proof. a) Let σ i+1 ∈ Σ i+1 . Suppose there exists S ∈ arg max
We see three cases:
. We have to prove that
, we proceed like in case a).
we have three cases:
by Corollary 2).
If
We now prove the second statement. Let S ∈ arg max
Let σ i > ω i . We have shown that σ i − ω i ∈ Σ i+1 , thus
1. If σ i ≤ δ i+1 for some σ i ∈ Σ i , it follows from (6) and (3) that
be the case that for any
follows from Lemma 6 that
There are two possibilities:
• If b(i, τ i ) ≥ 0, it follows from (6) and (3) that (6) and (3) that
Hence b(i, σ i ) = 1 − d S∩P i and the result follows.
Lemma 9 Assume we are in B (d, i + 1) and
, then every party obtains zero.
Proof. a) Let σ i+1 ∈ Σ i+1 and τ i ∈ T i . We need to prove that
This will be due to party i + 1 having the option of setting
We examine each case in turn:
In principle, there are three possibilities for σ i+1 : either σ i+1 < γ i 0 , or σ i+1 ≥ γ i 0 and b
We will show that the first two possibilities lead to a contradiction. In both cases, Lemma 4 implies
From (9) we can deduce:
Under Lemma 4b):
In both cases, under Lemma 4,
We will prove that (11) leads to a contradiction, so that b
which is a contradiction.
•
. Under Lemma 4, we have two cases:
and thus b (i + 1, α) < 0.
Since b (i + 1, α) < 0 for all α, we conclude b
and thus by Lemma 5 all the parties get zero.
Let us consider the following strategy profile for the parties. In B (d, n), party n forms a coalition S ∪ {n} with S ∈ arg max Let i < n and assume we have defined the strategies for parties in
, party i proceeds as follows:
2. If Σ i = {ω i }, party i forms coalition S ∪ {i} with S ∈ arg min
If there is more than one possible choice of S, party i uses the tiebreaking rule: Among all the optimal coalitions S ∈ arg min
party i selects the ones that contain the party with the highest index 3. If {ω i } Ã Σ i , party i can anticipate the coalition S * that will be formed should it demand d * i and its followers play the strategies we have defined.
(a) If i / ∈ S * , party i forms coalition S ∪{i} with S ∈ arg min
If there is more than one possible S, party i uses the tie-breaking rule.
(b) If i ∈ S * , party i compares the coalitions S ∈ arg max
and S * ∩ P i . Among them, party i selects a coalition following the tie-breaking rule. If S * is chosen, party i demands
given as in (1) . If S 6 = S * is chosen, then party i demands
The role of the tie-breaking rule is to ensure that parties have a best response at all stages (cf. Example ??).
Proposition 1
The above strategies constitute a SPE for any B (d, i).
Proof. We proceed by backwards induction on i. For i = n, its strategy is clearly optimal.
Assume now the result is true for B (d, i + 1) and moreover assume the following two conditions hold:
Condition 1
The formed coalition satisfies
for some σ i+1 ∈ Σ i+1 . (This condition holds trivially for i + 1 = n because Σ n = {ω n }).
Condition 2
The above S and σ i+1 are such that S ∩ P i+1 is one of the most favorable sets for party i (i.e. i / ∈ S implies i / ∈ T for all T ∈ arg max
(1 − d T ) and all σ i+1 ∈ Σ i+1 ). Among them, it is one of the most favorable to party i − 1, etc. (This condition holds for i + 1 = n because Σ n = {ω n } and n applies the tie-breaking rule).
We check that this remains true for B (d, i). Let τ i ∈ T i . We have two cases:
1. If σ i > ω i for all σ i ∈ Σ i , then it is straightforward to check that party i obtains stricly less than d * i by forming coalition. If i demands
The induction hypothesis (Conditions 1 and 2) implies that d * i will be accepted. Assume party i deviates by demanding 
If
This means that if party i forms a winning coalition it obtains a final payoff of b (i, ω i ). Suppose party i deviates and demands
It is enough to check that i / ∈ S for all S ∈ arg max
and all σ i+1 ∈ Σ i+1 . Under the induction hypothesis applied to Condition 1, this means that party i will not be included in any eventual winning coalition, and its final payoff will be zero, while the original strategy yields a nonnegative payoff.
For constant-sum homogeneous games it is always the case that ω i ≤ δ i+1 , thus b(i + 1, ω i ) is well defined. Under Lemma 4b),
Suppose that i ∈ S for some S ∈ arg min
and hence
which is a contradiction. This contradiction proves that i / ∈ S for all S ∈ arg min
We now check that for some σ i ∈ Σ i .
The induction hypothesis holds for party n. Now suppose it holds for party i + 1. Does it hold for party i? q . Given this demand, q − ω 1 ∈ Σ 2 .
Assume now d j = ω j q for all j ∈ P i , and q − ω P i ∈ Σ i . Then,
